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SUPREME COURT REVIEW
FOREWORD: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE




Assessing the product of any new Supreme Court term's efforts
in criminal procedure has become a suspiciously attractive intellec-
tual exercise. The criminal procedure decisions of the Supreme
Court over the last quarter-century- especially those dealing with
rights to exclude evidence under the fourth, fifth, and sixth amend-
ments and the due process clause-provide wonderfully plastic ma-
terial for political drama. These are the most visible documents in
the culture of our legal politics. They represent the repetitive, stark
clash between two adversaries, the police and the suspect, who rep-
resent, respectively, the state and the citizenry, both in their most
morally equivocal guises. Moreover, this rich material comes to us
now in a scripted dramatic story-the pattern of expansion of con-
stitutional protection under the Warren Court followed by the re-
versal of that protection under the Burger Court. Whatever sense it
makes to talk of a change in the identity of the Chief Justice as de-
marking distinct historical periods, the pattern of viewing the doc-
trine in terms of two opposed historical phases of the Court makes
the political melodrama neater and starker.
The conventional view of this doctrinal history has, of course,
ensured a voluminous academic literature, since it guarantees com-
mentators a political theme. Nevertheless, this conventional view
has lost some of its intellectual attraction in recent years. One rea-
son is precisely that this view is the conventional one: the doctrinal
history of the War of the Courts suffers the most ignoble of sins any
* Associate Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. J.D., Stanford Law School,
1979; Ph.D., Harvard University, 197 1; B.A., City College of N.Y., 1966.
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idea can have-it has become uninteresting. Assessing a new year's
set of decisions, we tend to engage in a sort of mechanical outcome
counting and evaluation. Though occasionally we hear rumors of
drastic revolutionary or counter-revolutionary changes,' the new
case law chiefly seems to present subtle but predictable new permu-
tations of state-defendant encounters, permutations that manifest
minor changes in established doctrine. We then can simply examine
where the Burger Court has retrenched on Warren Court due pro-
cess jurisprudence, noting that it has gone a little farther than, or
not quite so far as, the previous terms' cases might have suggested.
Indeed, what enhances the sense of mechanical repetition is that
even more than in other areas of constitutional law, the criminal
procedure opinions themselves seem to be drawn from rhetoric
banks in the Justices' word-processors. 2
The conventional view, however, suffers from a more substan-
tive flaw: It ultimately seems hollow because it assumes that the
opinions are effectual and significant in the very terms in which they
are written. The conventional view reflects and reinforces the im-
pression that the doctrinal developments and conflicts in the
Supreme Court's criminal procedure case law vitally influence the
administration of criminal justice in the United States. Many ob-
servers find it very difficult to reconcile this view with sensible ob-
servations of the world in which the decisions are assumed to
operate-either the small world of the criminal justice system or the
wider social world which the criminal justice system is supposed to
influence.3 Moreover, it becomes harder to make this reconciliation
as the political rhetoric of the opinions becomes grander.
In this Article, I want to set out briefly several forms of the con-
ventional view, illustrated by both the language of the Court and the
views of the commentators. Then I will review various ways in
which commentators, and to some extent the Justices themselves,
have begun, most markedly over the last few years, to reassess and
cast doubt on the conventional view of both the meaning and the
social effects of the procedural doctrines. In short, I will present a
1 Before United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), we heard rumors that the im-
pending good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule would apply to all searches, not
just those based on warrants. One hears rumors that the more drastic version of the
good-faith rule, or the still more drastic steps of repealing the exclusionary rule or ap-
plying Leon to Miranda violations, are imminent.
2 A good example of the rhetoric of criminal procedure doctrine is the well-estab-
lished trope about "totality-of-the-circumstances" tests replacing bright-line rules. See,
e.g.,Justice Rehnquist's invocation of this trope in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-41
(1983).
3 See infra notes 47-81 and accompanying text.
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taxonomy of what might be called skeptical or critical or revisionist
views of the conventional history. These views suggest, sometimes
expressly and sometimes obliquely, that the Supreme Court doc-
trine has been a vastly over-rated and over-invested phenomenon.
All of these views suggest some image of the world as resistant to or
ignorant of the doctrine or doctrinal changes. Yet they also suggest
(again, sometimes expressly, sometimes obliquely) that the doctrine
plays primarily symbolic roles in politics, roles which largely distract
our attention from important questions about criminal justice.
II. THE CONVENTIONAL HISTORY
What I call the "conventional" view holds or assumes that the
Court's criminal procedure decisions are important or effectual in
the dramatic terms in which they are often written. It is thus neither
a conservative or liberal view although arguably it has both its con-
servative and liberal versions. 4 The conventional doctrinal history is
that the Warren Court expanded the rights of criminal defendants,
thereby in some measure inhibiting or improving the work of the
police and prosecutor, and that the Burger Court has significantly
reversed the Warren Court's effects. The purest liberal version of
the conventional view is that the Warren Court jurisprudence trans-
formed the criminal justice system and sent out wider emanations of
political fairness and equality; in the conservative version, the War-
ren Court drastically hampered the efforts of honest policemen,
thus inducing an increase in crime or in the freedom of criminals to
escape prosecution.
Conversely, in the liberal version, the Burger Court has
brought us closer to what we would call in political symbolic lan-
guage a police state; however, in the conservative version, the Bur-
ger Court has enabled honest policemen to re-establish control over
crime. One need not read much academic commentary to observe
this conventional view because the ritualized opinions of the Justices
state the matter so clearly,5 and the conventional commentary tends
4 1 do not mean to suggest that the liberal and conservative postures on criminal
justice are concerned only with the issues of constitutional criminal procedure discussed
here, though I think those issues have unfortunately played a central role in contempo-
rary legal politics.
5 Compare Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,445 (1984)(defendant's claim of exclusion
"wholly fails to take into account the enormous societal cost of excluding truth in the
search for truth in the administration of justice"), with Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
(1983)(Brennan, J., dissenting)("today's decision threatens to obliterate one of the most
fundamental distinctions between our form of government, where officers are under the




to mirror the opinions. Yet most writers on the Supreme Court sim-
ply assume that literal changes in doctrine or outcome carry impor-
tant social and political influence in the very terms in which the
opinions speak.
6
Of course, this conventional view sets up the debate over the
doctrine in liberal and conservative terms, but does not resolve it. It
establishes the task of liberal judges and commentators as that of (1)
asserting the importance of the defendant's interest, either individu-
ally or as a surrogate for all people who might become the objects of
police action, and asserting that this interest is directly affected by
doctrinal holdings; while (2) casting doubt on the state's or public's
interest in law enforcement-either by questioning the moral or
political legitimacy of the state's interest or by questioning, as an
instrumental or empirical matter, whether a doctrinal holding favor-
ing the police would functionally advance that interest. The liberal
side often makes its affirmative case by merely asserting or assuming
the categorical nature of rights of privacy or freedom from harass-
ment or coercion. 7 In one sense, the liberals should have an advan-
tage here, because they primarily represent the interest of the
individual claimant, an interest that is not falsifiable, and cannot be
subject to empirical skepticism as obviously as the law enforcement
interest. The defendant's interest can, of course, be subject to phil-
osophical skepticism though it rarely is. The liberals rarely make
articulate rights-based arguments and the conservatives rarely make
broad philosophical attacks on rights theories.
Of course, the conservative doctrine is occasionally expressed
in what can somewhat generously be called the language of political
philosophy. The Justices sometimes try to offer a narrowed general
view of expectations of privacy,8 or to describe social institutions in
6 Representative citation is futile here, since by "most writers" I include, for exam-
ple, the overwhelming majority of law review notes on criminal procedure over the last
decade, but some notable examples of commentary that have taken the doctrine ex-
tremely seriously are: Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York. Some Anxious Observations on
the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YAL LJ. 1198 (1971); Grano, Kirby,
Biggers & Ash, Do any Constitutional Safeguards Remain Against the Danger of Convicting the
Innocent?, 72 MICH. L. REv. 717 (1974); Chase, The Burger Court, the Individual and the
Criminal Process: Directions and Misdirections, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 518 (1977).
7 For example, in his dissent in Leon, Justice Brennan, before proceeding to argue
that the good-faith rule espoused there is based on faulty reasoning even within utilita-
rian terms, seems to foreclose an utilitarian approach to the fourth amendment. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 930 (1984) (BrennanJ., dissenting)("the Framers of the Bill of Rights in-
sisted that law enforcement efforts be permanently and unambiguously restricted in or-
der to preserve personal freedoms").
8 E.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984)(fourth amendment recog-
nizes "that certain enclaves should be free from arbitrary governmental interference"
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general terms that suggest the necessary subjugation of the individ-
ual to institutional needs.9 But the conservative argument has
tended instead to take two other forms: (1) finessing the defend-
ant's rights-based arguments by attacking Warren Court principles
as merely artificial legal rules bearing only attenuated relationships
to those rights; or (2) asserting the countervailing interest in law
enforcement. The first of these arguments has been appearing with
increased frequency lately as majority opinions seem to underscore
the generosity of the Court in retaining legal rules which do not
perfectly coincide with constitutional rights. Thus, the Court main-
tains that the Miranda rule is only a constructive presumption to
protect the substantive fifth amendment,' 0 or that the exclusionary
rule is a tangential device for protecting what conservatives might
otherwise concede are categorical privacy rights under the fourth
amendment. 11
However, the conservative side usually has relied on the second
argument. It avoids or concedes the issue of the strength of the
defendant's interest, and asserts instead that the proper terms of the
doctrine are a balancing calculus in which the state's interest fre-
quently is the greater, and that recognizing the defendant's interest
would create unacceptable costs. In United States v. Leon, for exam-
ple, Justice White explicitly purports to resolve the good-faith issue
"by weighing the costs and benefits of preventing the use in the
prosecution's case-in-chief of inherently trustworthy tangible evi-
dence," and notes the "substantial social costs exacted by the exclu-
sionary rule."'12 Justice White asserts that "[b]ecause we find that
the rule can have no substantial deterrent effect in the sorts of situa-
tions under consideration in this case,... we conclude that it cannot
pay its way in those situations."' 3
but "[t]here is no societal interest in protecting the privacy of those activities, such as
the cultivation of crops, that occur in open fields.").
9 See NewJersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 743 (1985)(balancing "accommodation of
the privacy interests of schoolchildren with the substantial need of teachers and adminis-
trators for freedom to maintain order in the schools"); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,
526 (1984)("recognition of privacy rights for prisoners in their individual cells simply
cannot be reconciled with the concept of incarceration and the needs and objectives of
penal institutions").
10 Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1291 (1985).
11 Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984).
12 Id. Justice White acknowledges the empirical evidence that only a tiny proportion
of suppression motions succeed or lead to acquittals, but he argues that the costs are
nevertheless large in absolute terms. Id. at n.6.
13 Id. The Court began making sure that the exclusionary rule was not getting a free
ride in such cases as United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 433 (1974) and Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465 (1976). Cf. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 651 (1984)(Court has been
willing to accept consequences of Miranda rules "when the primary social cost of those
[Vol. 76836
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There is an occasional liberal attack on the entire phenomenon
of cost-benefit analysis as false economics. The attack is reflected in
Justice Brennan's complaint that Leon-style cost-benefit analyses are
"inherently unstable compounds of intuition, hunches, and occa-
sional pieces of partial and often inconclusive data." 14 Justice Bren-
nan decries "the ritual incantation of the 'substantial social costs'
exacted by the exclusionary rule, followed by the virtually foreor-
dained conclusion that, given the marginal benefits, application of
the rule in the circumstances of these cases is not warranted."'15 But
the usual liberal rebuttal has been to accept the calculus, and then to
question the conservatives' data or arithmetic.
Thus, liberals question the actual, empirically observable cost
to society of exclusionary rules. 16 Alternatively, they demand better
logic or more sociological sophistication in judicial measurements
of the deterrent effects of these rules, thereby implying a strong af-
firmative argument that the doctrine is indeed capable of powerful
real-world effects in constraining the state's abuse of political
power. 17 But even when they make these arguments, the liberals
demonstrate that they are relatively defenseless against the con-
servative strategy of establishing instrumental and empirical argu-
ments as the relevant terms of debate.
Indeed, the doctrinal argument has absorbed cost-benefit anal-
ysis. Thus, Richard Posner's economic arguments about the fourth
amendment,' 8 though hardly written in doctrinal language, accept
the assumption that the doctrines have significant instrumental ef-
fects in their intended terms. His analysis is sophisticated in the
sense that it does not simply assume that all doctrinal outcomes
favoring the police are necessarily socially useful. 19 But Posner is
strictly in the mainstream (of course, he has helped define the main-
added protections is the possibility of fewer convictions," but when we add the social
cost of physical harm that could be avoided by quick interrogation of suspects "the cost
would have been something more than merely the failure to obtain evidence").
14 Leon, 468 U.S. at 942 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
15 Id. at 949.
16 Id. at 950 n. 11. (citing, e.g., REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED
STATES, IMPACT OF THE EXOLUSiONARY RULE ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 14
(1979)).
17 E.g., Leon, 468 U.S. at 955 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(if the exclusionary rule is seen
as an educative inducement to police, not as "punishment," it can broadly promote in-
stitutional compliance).
18 Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 Sup. CT. REv. 49.
19 Posner correctly notes the flaw in the theory that the exclusionary rule cannot
deter good-faith police conduct that proves to violate the fourth amendment. Posner
concedes that any increase in the penalty for fourth amendment violations will some-
what increase deterrence of these violations. He would apply a good-faith exception
only to tort liability, on the theory that excessive financial penalties for police miscon-
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stream), when he assumes that fourth amendment doctrine, or at
least broad reliance on the exclusionary rule, imposes significant
costs, and that a change in doctrine would significantly reduce those
costs.
Despite the obvious intellectual attractions of the conventional
view, there remains an irreducible uncertainty about the assumed
significance of this wonderfully rich political documentation. To the
extent that we can identify the relevant data, we find grave empirical
doubt that the Supreme Court's doctrine or its associated exclusion-
ary rules have much of the effect that the liberals or conservatives
assert they have at the practical level on which policemen and sus-
pects operate.20 Even assuming that the Warren Court's expansive
jurisprudence of criminal procedure substantially influenced the
world of criminal justice, it remains unclear whether, as the scripted
drama would suggest, the Burger Court's reversal of that expansion
has had the great influence that a conventional reading of the cases
might suggest. Although the apparent change in the political direc-
tion of the criminal procedure case law seems to align with per-
ceived changes in the wider world of political attitudes in the United
States, it is not clear that the insular, finely-tuned universe of crimi-
nal procedure jurisprudence plays that large a role in the political
and economic struggles whose rhetoric often sounds in the opin-
ions. But whatever its bases, skepticism about the meaning or the
effects of the doctrine has taken a variety of forms in the commen-
tary and, ironically, in the opinions themselves.
III. SOME VERSIONS OF THE SKEPTICAL
A. DENIALS OF HISTORICAL CHANGE
First, one finds a category of views which assume that criminal
procedure doctrine is effectual at some level, but which implicitly or
explicitly deny the conventional historical view that the Burger
Court has dramatically reversed the effects created by an expansive
Warren Court jurisprudence. One such view hardly seems to have a
duct will skew their incentive to engage in aggressive conduct that falls just barely on the
safe side of the legal rules. Id. at 65-66.
20 E.g., Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45
N.Y.U. L. REV. 785, 792 (1970)(trial judges, magistrates, police, and prosecutors are so
psychologically predisposed against suspects and defendants that constitutional rights
get overwhelmed); Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the
"Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of "Lost"Arrests, 1982 AM.
BAR. FOUND. RESEARCHJ. 611 (few suppression motions lead to acquittals or reversals);
Note, Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE LJ. 1519 (1967) [here-




skeptical or revisionist theme, because it works within very old-fash-
ioned principles and assumptions we associate with Legal Process
jurisprudence. This view does not necessarily deny that the Burger
Court doctrine has reversed much of the work of the Warren Court,
but it does deny, if only implicitly, the substantive political signifi-
cance of the doctrinal differences. It thus leaves larger goals essen-
tially unexamined and questions means, focusing on the perennial
issues of police (or sometimes magistrate or trial court) discretion.2 1
This view assumes that the police and courts are significantly af-
fected by doctrine, but it does not concern itself much with the eco-
nomically or politically controversial nature of those effects. Rather,
it assumes the problem to be one of establishing the right mix of
regulation and discretion in the behavior of police and other actors
in the system and views the changes in the doctrine simply as affect-
ing that mix. 22 Hence, this view tends to treat doctrinal conflicts in
the abstract in terms of choices between bright-line rules and flexi-
ble standards, 23 or, at a more practical level, in terms of common
sense or sociological or psychological perspectives on how police-
men make daily decisions about matters like probable cause or
exigency.
24
A second form of denial of historical change, chiefly espoused
by liberal commentators, engages in a form of refined or revisionist
outcome-counting or doctrine-reading. Proponents of this view
seem to assume that the doctrine is indeed significant and effectual
in its explicit terms, but challenge the conventional view that the
Burger Court has done all that much to reverse the Warren court.
Recently, Yale Kamisar has suggested that the differences between
the Courts have been exaggerated: Miranda for example, en-
croached far less on police interrogation than it might have, and the
Burger Court has done far less to retrench on Miranda than it might
have.25 Similarly, in a comprehensive article assessing almost a dec-
ade of Burger Court doctrine, Stephen Saltzburg offers a corrective
view of the conventional notion that the police were always the
21 See Discretion in Law Enforcement, 47 LAw & CoNTEM. PROBS. 1 (Autumn 1984)(R.
Allen. ed.).
22 E.g., Grano, Probable Cause and Common Sense: A Reply to the Critics of Illinois v. Gates,
17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 465, 505-12 (1984).
23 E.g., Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1468 (1985).
24 See, e.g., Uviller, The Unworthy Victim: Police Discretion in the Credibility Call, 47 LAw &
CONTEM. PROBS. 15 (1984).
25 Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was It Really So Defense Minded?), The Burger Court (Was It
Really So Prosecution Oriented?) and Police Investigatory Practices, in THE BURGER COURT: THE
COUNTER-REvoLUTION THAT WASN'T 62 (V. Blasi ed. 1983).
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losers under Warren and then always won under Burger.26 We do
indeed tend to forget, or deny, that the Warren Court produced
Warden v. Hayden,27 Chapman v. California,28 and Hoffa v. United
States.29 Most importantly, it produced Terry v. Ohio,30 the concep-
tual progenitor of all the fine-tuned cost-benefit balancing that has
essentially undone the warrant and probable cause rules in the Bur-
ger Court. Conversely, we tend to forget or deny that the Burger
Court has produced Brewer v, Williams,3 ' United States v. Henry, 32 and
Payton v. New York. 33 Saltzburg's thesis seems conventional in its as-
sertion that the Court's overall doctrine is essentially sound and ef-
fective, but it is unconventional in denying that either in intention or
effect, the Burger Court has destroyed the Warren Court's
achievements.
Perhaps because of some specific instances of wishful thinking,
Saltzburg's article occasionally evinces a tone of rationalization.3
4
But the rationalizing approach to denial of historical change in the
doctrine is more evident in another major comprehensive article, by
Jerold Israel, assessing the Burger Court.35 Israel argues for the
doctrinal continuity of the two Courts on such fundamental matters
as selective incorporation of provisions of the Bill of Rights36 and
various forms of economic equality embedded in criminal due pro-
cess.3 7 He also reaches backwards from controversial Burger Court
26 Saltzburg, Foreword: The Flow and Ebb of Constitutional Criminal Procedure in the Warren
and Burger Courts, 69 GRo. L. J. 1512 (1980).
27 387 U.S. 294 (1967)(expanding police search power beyond contraband and in-
struments of crime to "mere evidence").
28 386 U.S. 18 (1967)(establishing that constitutional violation can be harmless error
at trial).
29 385 U.S. 293 (1966)(police use of undercover agent for non-coercive conversation
not controlled by fourth amendment).
30 392 U.S. 1 (1968)(establishing police power to stop and frisk suspects without war-
rant or probable cause).
31 430 U.S. 387 (1977)(reaffirming sixth amendment restrictions on interrogation).
32 447 U.S. 264 (1980)(reaffirming sixth amendment right even outside context of
formal interrogation).
33 445 U.S. 573 (1980)(arrest warrant required for arrest of suspect in his home).
34 E.g., Saltzburg, supra note 26, at 187 (Burger Court decision in Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (holding that police are not required to warn people of
fourth amendment rights when requesting consent to search) is consistent with Warren
Court decisions on interrogation); Saltzburg, supra at 202 (Burger Court's decision in
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) is consistent with Warren Court view of
interrogation, despite its illogical application to reject fifth amendment claim in same
case).
35 Israel, Criminal Procedure, The Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75
MicH. L. REV. 1319 (1977).
36 Id. at 1327-31. It is difficult to determine whether Attorney General Edwin Meese
III will try to induce discontinuity on this matter.
37 Id. at 1331-39. At least two decisions from last Term support Israel's position on
840 [Vol. 76
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decisions to suggest that the Warren Court might not have disap-
proved of these decisions. More than Saltzburg, Israel engages in a
form of rationalization that suggests that he might somewhat disin-
genuously be urging the Burger Court itself not to believe its own
express intentions, or at least that he hopes liberal lower courts will
look for some political margin left by the Burger Court.38 Some-
what more convincingly, Israel suggests that even if we read Warren
and Burger Court doctrine as fundamentally inconsistent, the War-
ren Court doctrine had important practical effects on police behav-
ior which, because of governmental inertia or caution, will survive
the doctrinal reversal.
3 9
The most original and sophisticated version of the denial of his-
torical change in the doctrine is that of Louis Seidman. 40 He chal-
lenges the conventional view of doctrinal discrepancy between the
Warren and Burger Courts, not by outcome-counting or doctrinal
rationalization, but by raising the question to a more abstract level.
Seidman attacks the specific version of the conventional view that
the Burger Court's reversal of Warren Court due process has taken
the form of redirecting criminal procedure law toward the primary
goal of determining the guilt or innocence of defendants and dero-
gating those values or rights which serve goals other than truthful
fact-finding.4 1 He interprets the cases to show that the Burger
Court, no less than the Warren Court, has asked the criminal justice
system to do far more than to separate the guilty from the innocent;
it too has used the criminal prosecution as a means of broader social
this point. In Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985)(due process entitles defendant
to state-provided psychiatrist when he claims insanity in capital case), and Evitts v.
Lucey, 105 S. Ct. 830 (1985) (sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel
extends to direct appeal), the Burger Court has confirmed or extended the concept that
criminal defendants are entitled to roughly equal or symmetrical litigation resources at
trial or on appeal, though of course the Burger Court takes a different view of pre-trial
matters.
38 For a somewhat torturous rationalization of one of the most notorious Burger
Court decisions, Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972)(right of counsel at line-up only
applies after state brings formal charges by indictment or otherwise), and for an argu-
ment that the related case of United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973)(no right of coun-
sel at photo-identification procedure) might not have offended the Warren Court that
produced United States v. Wade 388 U.S. 218 (1967), see Israel, supra note 35, at 1368
n.224, 1370-72. See also, id. at 1374 (Burger Court restrictions on scope of Miranda im-
plicitly accept fundamental premises of Miranda).
39 Israel, supra note 35, at 1424 n.438 (Warren Court decisions induced greater sense
of "professionalism" among criminal lawyers on both sides, and enhanced interest in
legislative reform).
40 Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and Change in
Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 436 (1980).
41 Seidman attributes this version of the conventional view to both commentators
and the language of the Burger Court itself. Id. at 437.
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engineering, though the goals of the engineering have changed
since the Warren days. Criminal defendants remain bit players in a
larger regulatory drama. For the Burger Court, accurate determina-
tion of guilt or innocence is less important than the functional per-
ception of the system as a tool of crime control.
42
In Seidman's view, though we may have learned from the War-
ren era that we cannot afford a criminal justice system that separates
the guilty from the innocent, deters government misconduct, and
serves broader social goals, the Burger court is making similar mis-
takes. Indeed, the Burger Court has reached pro-defendant out-
comes to serve such goals as general racial equality43 and pro-state
decisions which at least recognize the importance of even those con-
stitutional rights which disserve truthful fact-finding.44 But in the
great number of cases where the Burger Court's outcome has fa-
vored the state, the doctrine nevertheless is concerned with matters
other than guilt or innocence: matters like controlling the conduct
of the criminal defense bar,45 or ensuring the broad general deter-
rent effect of the substantive criminal law regardless of the moral
desert of the individual defendant. 4
6
B. MAINSTREAM NIHILISM.
Next is a set of views which explicitly doubt the significance or
effectuality of the entire doctrinal enterprise of fourth, fifth, and
sixth amendment and due process rights. These views hold that the
doctrine, whether in rhetoric or outcome, and regardless of any his-
torical doctrinal changes, does not matter all that much, because it
does not affect the actual workings of the system. I call this category
"mainstream nihilism," because in treating the practical world to
42 Id. at 437-48.
43 Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979) (claims of racial discrimination in selection of
grand jury foremen can be raised on federal habeas).
44 Seidman argues that Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)(fourth amendment
claims generally cannot be raised on federal habeas) at least conceded that the fourth
amendment necessarily disserves truthful fact-finding at trial in the name of other goals.
Seidman, supra note 40, at 451-54.
45 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (limiting defendant's right to raise on fed-
eral habeas constitutional claims waived at state trial where the defendant cannot dis-
prove that his defense counsel may have deliberately "sandbagged" state processes).
46 Seidman argues that the Burger Court's plea bargaining decisions in such cases as
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974)(voluntary guilty plea does not waive claim that
defendant's felony indictment was prosecutor's vindictive reaction to defendant's appeal
from misdemeanor conviction for same crime) and Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742
(1970) (guilty plea upheld where defendant made plea to life imprisonment even though
conviction at trial may have led to death penalty under federal statute later held uncon-
stitutional) reveal that the Court has pursued goals wholly independent of establishing
the factual guilt of particular defendants. Seidman, supra note 40, at 470-83.
842 [Vol. 76
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which the doctrine is supposedly irrelevant, it describes that world
in fairly ordinary terms correlative with conventional liberal or con-
servative politics. I therefore want to distinguish it from more so-
cially critical forms of doctrinal nihilism, which I describe below.
1. Simple Empiricism
The most straightforward version of this view, which one finds
more in casual contact with criminal lawyers than in academic com-
mentary, is simply that relatively few cases raise serious constitu-
tional or procedural problems of law or fact. This simple version of
empirical irrelevancy is obviously at least consistent with the empiri-
cal studies that suggest that the major doctrinal efforts of the War-
ren Court have had very small effects on crime rates, 47 or conviction
rates,48 or on the relationship between police and suspects,
49
though it is rather obviously not the only way to explain those em-
pirical results.50 This view obviously is subject to charges of circu-
larity or economic naivete: if few cases appear to reveal
constitutional issues, it may be because few defendants can afford or
obtain lawyers who are skillful enough to detect and litigate these
issues, or because the dishonesty of policemen, the ignorance of
suspects, and the incompetence of courts converge to create the ap-
pearance that few cases raise constitutional issues. This charge
damages the simple empirical argument, but I prefer to address it
below under the rubric of critical nihilism.
2. The Irrelevance of Prosecution
The simple empirical argument is compatible with the rather
questionable notion that the fully-litigated trial model accurately
captures our criminal justice system. Its point is that trials tend to
be about guilt or innocence, not about procedural issues that con-
trol the court's or jury's decision about guilt or innocence. Some-
what stronger, more sharply skeptical versions of "mainstream
nihilism" attack the litigation-model more directly. Ironically, one
of these versions finds a source in a famous, cryptic passage in Chief
Justice Warren's opinion in Terry v. Ohio,51 where Warren laments
that recognizing constitutional rights by the device of exclusionary
47 See generally Seidman, supra note 40, at 439 n.13.
48 E.g., Davies, supra note 20.
49 E.g., Yale Project, supra note 20.
50 Among other things, it is also possible that the police enjoy some form of impunity
for their violations, or that police abuses are too subtle to be captured by any empirical
study.
51 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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rules may be futile because most of the abuses police commit on
people occur wholly outside the context of criminal prosecution,
and thus cannot be affected by rules designed to influence the con-
duct or content of litigation. Warren's intriguing remarks deserve
more attention than they have received for their striking tonal pre-
tense of purported social realism and practical skepticism:
Street encounters between citizens and police officers are incredibly
rich in diversity. They range from wholly friendly exchanges of
pleasantries or mutually useful information to hostile confrontations
of armed men involving arrests, or injuries, or loss of life. Moreover,
hostile confrontations are not all of a piece. Some of them begin in a
friendly enough manner, only to take a different turn upon the injec-
tion of some unexpected element into the conversation. Encounters
are initiated by the police for a wide variety of purposes, some of
which are wholly unrelated to a desire to prosecute for crime ....
Doubtless some police "field interrogation" conduct violates the
Fourth Amendment. But a stern refusal by this Court to condone such
activity does not necessarily render it responsive to the exclusionary
rule .... Proper adjudication of cases in which the exclusionary rule is
invoked demands a constant awareness of these limitations. The
wholesale harassment by certain elements of the police community, of
which minority groups... complain, will not be stopped by the exclu-
sion of any evidence from any criminal trial. Yet a rigid and unthink-
ing application of the exclusionary rule, in futile protest against
practices which it can never be used to control, may exact a high toll in
human injury and frustration of efforts to prevent crime. No judicial
opinion can comprehend the protean variety of the street encounter
52
In short, the exclusionary rule may be irrelevant to the larger polit-
ical effects of the criminal justice system, because the trial model,
indeed prosecution itself, is not central to the criminal justice sys-
tem, which is a diverse cultural and "protean" system of power-as-
sertion. This is an amazing concession by Chief Justice Warren at
the end of his career, and, were it supported by other evidence that
he was a reflective legal scholar, it would have fascinating biographi-
cal significance. 53
3. Plea Bargaining
The most frequently expressed version of mainstream nihilism,
and the one with the most empirical support, is the version that fo-
cuses on plea bargaining. In this view, the entire doctrinal enter-
prise revolving around searches and seizures, confessions, and the
52 Id. at 13-14.
53 There is some evidence, however, that the idea for this passage came from Justice
Brennan. B. SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF 688 (1983).
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like floats blithely and irrelevantly above a gritty unregulated market
of plea bargaining in which the exchange of the crude commodities
of the system, not any regulatory norm, governs the disposition of
cases.
Of course, while the vast majority of cases are bargained with-
out any formal litigation, this hardly establishes the irrelevancy of
criminal procedure doctrines. The most formal economic model of
plea bargaining indeed implicitly accommodates the doctrine and
even suggests that the doctrine achieves more precise and sensitive
effects in the world of plea bargaining than in the world of trials. In
Frank Easterbrook's model,5 4 bargaining between defendants and
prosecutors sets prices for crimes-or rewards for pleas-that accu-
rately reflect the probabilities of outcome at trial. He argues that
those numbers accurately discount the probability of outcomes of
verdict-controlling suppression motions as well as the probability of
the verdicts themselves, and indeed better reflect the subtleties of
the procedural doctrines because, unlike actual trials or suppression
motions, they do not arbitrarily "round off" the probabilities. 55 On
the other hand, even if we deny that the doctrine rationally affects
prices in the market, we might join John Langbein in treating the
doctrine as affecting the market in a more fundamental-and more
perverse-way: Plea bargaining may be an irrational and unfair
thing, but it only exists because Warren Court-style procedural ju-
risprudence has so effectively raised the cost of criminal trials that it
has forced prosecutors to create, and defendants to accept, a rela-
tively cheap alternative system.56
Liberal critics of plea bargaining, led by Albert Alschuler, es-
sentially have made doctrinal nihilism a part of their criticism of this
legal underworld. In this view, Easterbrook's vision of a market ac-
curately pricing constitutional rights is an absurd economic fantasy,
and Langbein's argument that constitututional rights are effectual in
a perversely self-destructive way wrongly attributes plea bargaining
to rational economic behavior by responsible prosecutors and
judges.57 Rather, plea bargaining results from cynical and lazy
judges who search for deals indiscriminately; prosecutors whose
only goal is to rack up dispositions or accommodate the cynical, lazy
judges; public defenders who are too overwhelmed to even attempt
serious litigation of procedural issues; and narrow-minded privately
54 Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUDIES 289 (1983).
55 Id. at 316-17.
56 Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 58 PUB. INTEREST 43 (1980); Land Without
Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It, 78 MIcH. L. REv. 204, 205 (1979).
57 Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 652, 690 (1981).
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appointed defense lawyers whose perceived economic incentives
bear no correlation to their clients' interests. 58 In this world, the
procedural doctrines are irrelevant, compromised, and ignored. 59
4. The Worlds of Harmless Error
One final version of nihilism is so "mainstream" that it has its
source in Burger Court doctrine itself. A large category of suppos-
edly disparate doctrines has emerged over the last few years that
may be very loosely placed under the principle of "harmless illegal-
ity." The notion of harmless constitutional error officially started in
the Warren Court's Chapman60 decision and bears an interesting re-
lationship to the somewhat different form of doctrinal skepticism I
noted earlier in Warren's Terry opinion. The Terry passage ques-
tioned the importance of the trial model to the Court's own proce-
dural doctrine by suggesting that many unconstitutional police
actions occur outside the context of litigation and so cannot find any
remedy in rules of exclusion. The harmless error rule, by contrast,
accepts the litigation model of the criminal justice system and also
assumes, contrary to the "simple empirical irrelevancy view" de-
scribed earlier, that many criminal prosecutions reveal constitu-
tional violations. The harmless error approach assumes, however,
that we can reconstruct the world of the criminal trial after sub-
tracting the constitutionally inadmissible evidence that the viola-
tions produced and thereby determine whether the violations had
any effect on the guilty verdict.
"Harmless error," then, is a form of doctrinal skepticism: it
"discovers" that procedural doctrine is often irrelevant because the
exclusionary remedies normally entailed by the doctrine often have
no effect on trials. This is true, in turn, because, as a supposedly
empirical matter, most cases produce far more prosecution evidence
than the jury needs to establish reasonable doubt, and most of that
evidence arises without any constitutional problems. The Burger
Court has shown renewed interest in the harmless error approach to
the reconstruction of the criminal trial in recent cases, expressly in-
voking the term "harmless error, '' 6 ' as well as in cases where the
theory masquerades in other guises.
62
58 Id.
59 Id. at 713.
60 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
61 United States v. Young, 105 S. Ct. 1038 (1985) (illegal prosecution argument not
"plain error" where invited and not objected to by defense counsel, and which does not
"undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial and contribute to a miscarriage of
justice").
62 E.g., United States v. Bagley, 105 S. Ct. 3375 (1985) (plurality opinion) (in cases of
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One of the most interesting developments in recent Burger
Court doctrine is a form of "harmless error" review which recon-
structs and evaluates the world outside the criminal trial to determine
the effects of conceded constitutional violations. This indirect doc-
trinal maneuver enables the Court to apparently respect Warren
Court procedural doctrine for its moral validity, while adopting a
wizened pose of realism about the effects of the doctrine. It pur-
ports to discover a world of criminal investigation in which constitu-
tional violations play a minor role and shifts the burden of any
uncertainty about this world on to defendants. The skepticism of
this "harmless violation" approach is a more complex matter than
the skepticism of trial-based harmless error, since there is more po-
tential misinterpretation and circularity in reconstructing the real
world outside the trial than in reconstructing the trial itself.
The new approach has arisen in cases which, in the Court's per-
sistent but unconvincing view, fall into separate doctrinal categories
like "inevitable discovery," "independent source," and "dissipation
of the taint" within the general doctrine of the "fruits of the poison-
ous tree." The most obvious example is Nix v. Williams,63 which re-
vealed a situation so bizarrely conducive to this new doctrine that
even Justice Brennan disputed the result only obliquely. In Nix, the
Court left intact its own earlier holding that the "Christian Burial
Speech" interrogation by the Iowa police was flagrantly unconstitu-
tional.64 Yet it reconciled that holding with a second conviction on
retrial in which the prosecutor again introduced physical evidence-
the victim's body-to which the defendant Williams led the police
after the illegal interrogation. 65 Nix held that the illegal interroga-
tion was essentially causally irrelevant to the discovery of the body
because a separate course of investigation by the police-a sweeping
search across the Iowa terrain-was about to lead them to the body
the prosecution's failure to disclose requested exculpatory evidence, even where de-
fense counsel makes specific request, standard for reversal is whether there is a "reason-
able probability that, had the evidence been disclosed ... the result of the proceeding
would have been different"; reasonable probability is one "sufficient to undermine con-
fidence in the outcome," (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984))(similar
standard for claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel)).
63 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
64 In Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), the police were transporting Williams,
arrested for the murder of a girl, across Iowa after he had been arraigned and had ob-
tained counsel. Though the lawyer had warned the officers not to question Williams,
they nevertheless elicited from Williams information about the location of the girl's
body: Knowing Williams to be religious, they induced him to talk by reminding him that
the girl deserved a Christian burial. Id. at 389-92. The Court held that the police had
thereby violated Williams' sixth amendment right to counsel. Id. at 400-06.
65 Nix, 467 U.S. at 437.
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anyway.66 Even Justice Brennan had a hard time disputing that in
this extreme case the Court was not clearly wrong in its empirical
skepticism about the practical consequences of the constitutional vi-
olation, though his dissent really compounds rather than addresses
the confusion created by Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion as
to how to generally allocate the burden of this empirical
skepticism.
67
It was not enough for the Court in Nix to establish a legitimate
independent or concurrent cause of the discovery of the evidence.
To remain faithful to its supposedly realistic, functional view of the
exclusionary rule, the Court also had to demonstrate that the pres-
ence of this independent causal route meant that exclusion of the
evidence could not serve the goal of generally deterring police vio-
lations of the constitution. The Chief Justice's efforts in Nix and
other cases to make this demonstration have been derided as illogi-
cal. 68 Indeed, the anti-exclusion argument about deterrence might
be seen as another version of skepticism itself, a form of psychologi-
66 Id at 437-38.
67 The majority opinion offers the somewhat perplexing proposition that the state
need only prove the "inevitability" of the discovery by a preponderance of the evidence,
id. at 444, while Justice Brennan suggested that the standard was clear and convincing
evidence. Id. at 459-60. Thus, "inevitable discovery" is not a very useful description of
the issue.
68 With regard to the evidence directly resulting from illegal police action, ChiefJus-
tice Burger described the deterrence rationale as requiring that "the prosecution is not
to be put in a better position than it would have been if no illegality had transpired." Id.
at 443. But "the derivative evidence analysis ensures that the prosecution is not put in a
worse position simply because of some earlier police error or misconduct." Id. Chief
Justice Burger implicitly relies on an analogy between the exclusionary rule and liability
principles derived from tort law or substantive criminal law. While it may seem unfair to
hold a person liable for harm that would have occurred even despite the person's
wrongful action, in some doctrines, such as the law of attempt of complicity, we actually
do relax the requirement of proof of actual cause of harm. But analogies to liability
rules are unpersuasive in criminal procedure because the exclusionary rule does not
"punish" individual policemen. Rather, the goal of the rule is deterrence, and if police
departments know that they will lose inculpatory evidence that is in any way associated
with their illegal conduct, they will encounter a useful disincentive. ChiefJustice Burger
also is illogical when he rejects the "good faith" qualification to the "inevitable discov-
ery" principle. Id. at 445. By excluding evidence even where the police act in good
faith, we create a rule of negligence or even strict liability, but the concern for moral
proportionality that often leads us to reject negligence or strict liability rules is similarly
inapposite to the exclusionary rule. Even if we assume that a policeman who honestly
but wrongly thinks he is obeying the fourth amendment cannot be deterred, imposing a
sanction for that violation still serves to generally deter other policemen who do not act
in such good faith. Otherwise, those other policemen might interpret the lack of sanc-
tion in the earlier case as generally sanctioning violations of the fourth amendment.
Also, the sanction reduces the chances of a wily policeman contriving good-faith claims.
For a famous explanation of the analogous problem in criminal law, see H.L.A. HART,
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 18-20 (1968).
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cal skepticism about the degree to which police officers ever advert
to the potential legal consequences of their actions.
The most striking aspect of this new doctrine is its notion of
how we can, if at all, reconstruct the world minus the violation. The
Court claims the same sort of confidence in this type of reconstruc-
tion as it does when it reconstructs trials under conventional harm-
less error analysis. But to do so, the Court must make some rather
arbitrary, circular assumptions about this counter-factual reality.
The most intriguing assumption arises in Segura v. United States,69 a
hardly-noticed case which is in fact one of the Burger Court's most
bizarre decisions. The facts of Segura are complicated and disputed,
but the gist for present purposes can be simplified. The police ille-
gally entered Segura's apartment without a warrant, illegally ar-
rested and removed him, and proceeded to "seize" the apartment
for almost twenty hours, with perfectly 'visible contraband lying in
plain view. Meanwhile, other officers, relying on sound probable-
cause evidence which they obtained wholly independently of the
seizure of the apartment, apparently struggled for that same period
to find a magistrate. When they finally got a valid warrant, they en-
tered the apartment to take the contraband.
70
Oddly distinguishing the "independent source" doctrine appli-
cable here from the "inevitable discovery" doctrine of Nix, Chief
Justice Burger held in effect that the legal route to the evidence
taken by the police who sought, obtained, and executed the warrant
constituted an independent cause of the police getting the evidence.
Thus, the illegal entry of the apartment was irrelevant to the discov-
ery of the evidence.7 ' Alternatively, to use the terms I have sug-
gested, Segura's rights under fourth amendment doctrine had no
practical effect in the real world of the investigation. Obviously, the
ChiefJustice adopted a rather self-serving image of that real world.
By holding it extraneous that the illegal seizure of the apartment
made it possible for the supposedly "independent" legal route to
the evidence to succeed, the ChiefJustice once again adopted a pose
69 468 U.S. 796 (1984).
70 Id. ChiefJustice Burger questioned whether the entry was illegal in the first place
and whether a certain portion of the evidence discovered in purported plain view imme-
diately upon entry should be excluded, but he was bound by lower-court rulings which
the government did not challenge. Id. at 804.
71 Id. at 811. The ChiefJustice asserted that even if the entry was illegal, the subse-
quent "seizure" of the apartment was legal, holding, in effect, that the police have the
power to engage in what might be called an "internal stake-out" of private premises if
that action is reasonably necessary to preserve evidence for a warrant-based search. Id.
Even if his distinction between invasions of"possessory" and "privacy" interests is logi-
cal, the Chief Justice does not explain why the seizure of the apartment was not the
"tainted fruit" of the illegal entry.
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of wizened skepticism: It was mere "speculation" whether Segura
or a confederate would have removed and destroyed the evidence
while the police searched haplessly for a magistrate.
72
Perhaps not confident to rest the case on this somewhat mis-
placed effort at practical realism, the Chief Justice adopted in the
alternative a somewhat normatively qualified view of the recon-
structed real world: Even if we were to assume that, had the illegal
entry not taken place, Segura or an ally would have removed or de-
stroyed the evidence, that empirical possibility did not deserve any
constitutional recognition. Therefore, the Chief Justice "declined
to protect criminal activity" by recognizing, in effect, a "right" to
destroy evidence. 73 Yet, as Justice Stevens pointed out, though
there may not be, strictly speaking, a right to destroy evidence, one
of the premises of fourth amendment law is that the constitution
limits the state's access to evidence.74 Thus, the Constitution, in ef-
fect, indirectly protects an opportunity to destroy evidence. In his
contrived skepticism about the effects of fourth amendment doc-
trine and fourth amendment violations, the Chief Justice qualifies
his picture of the real world to ensure that the world is not better for
criminal suspects than they deserve.
A final example of the Court's "skepticism" maneuvers arises in
the area of confessions. In one line of cases involving Miranda rights
a few years ago, the Supreme Court had revealed an interesting
form of skepticism about the effect of constitutional doctrine in the
practical world, concluding that people who are not formally warned
of their Miranda rights must be presumed not to know they have
them or not to act on their knowledge of them.75 The Court's pos-
ture of realistic doubt about the effect of legal doctrine took a con-
troversial twist in one of the most rhetorically overheated cases from
last Term, Oregon v. Elstad.76 Elstad presented a new permutation of
Miranda rights and "fruits of the poisonous tree" doctrine. Elstad
had mumbled a very damning admission to the police after an ap-
parently illegal interrogation, and then gave a second confession af-
72 Id. at 815-16.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 835 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also correctly notes that the
deterrence rationale for the exclusionary rule, even as somewhat illogically constructed
by the Burger Court, applies very obviously in Segura, since the police engaged in the
extended seizure of the apartment precisely in order to wait for the search warrant. In
other words, the police tried to reap the benefits of a generous "independent source"
exception to the exclusionary rule. Id. at 836 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75 See, e.g., Jenkins v. Anderson, 446 U.8. 231 (1980) (prosecutor can impeach de-
fendant's credibility by questioning the defendant about pre-arrest silence before arrest
and the giving of Miranda warnings).
76 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985).
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ter he got the full Miranda warnings' 77 The Court held that the
illegality of the first interrogation did not necessarily taint the sec-
ond confession, especially where the first statement, though it did
reveal a violation of Miranda, did not offend the deeper norm re-
quiring that confessions or admissions be voluntary)'8
Most interestingly, Justice O'Connor's majority opinion man-
ages to get on the sophisticated, hard-headed side of the debate
over how the world really operates. Rejecting the defendant's psy-
chological argument that he was virtually destined to make the sec-
ond statement after assuming he had damned himself with the
first,79 she affects a skeptical view of human volition and puts the
burden of the resulting psychological uncertainty on the defendant.
The opinion concludes that "[t]he causal connection between any
psychological disadvantage created by his admission and his ulti-
mate decision to cooperate is speculative and attenuated at best. It
is difficult to tell with certainty what motivates a suspect to speak
.... ,"80 Expanding on a view of the causation of human speech
hinted at in earlier cases, 8 Justice O'Connor concludes that
although Miranda doctrine abstractly reflects moral principle, a real-
istic assessment of human behavior casts doubt on whether the doc-
trine has much effect.
C. THE CRITICAL VERSION OF SKEPTICISM
Fifty years ago, Thurman Arnold described the entire system of
criminal litigation as a perpetual dramatic ceremony which cele-
brates the competition of contrasting political ideals in our cul-
ture.8 2 Arnold's playful aestheticism, the gentle tone of his
iconoclasm, and his refusal to cast it in cynical terms probably have
77 Id. at 1289-90.
78 Id. at 291-94.
79 The defendant and Justice Brennan, in dissent, cited several police interrogation
manuals which instructed policemen that once a suspect felt that he had let "the cat out
of the bag" with one inculpatory statement, the suspect was likely to make a full confes-
sion. The manuals spoke in other metaphors like "collapsing structure" or "beach-
heads," id. at 1303-04 (Brennan, J., dissenting); so in her majority opinion, Justice
O'Connor purported to take a realistic stance by rejecting excessive reliance on meta-
phor. Id. at 1290.
80 Id. at 1296.
81 E.g., United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 277 (1977)(the Court held that a
fourth amendment violation that led the police to identify a third-party witness did not
require the suppression of that witness's testimony as "tainted fruits" since a "'living
witness is an individual human personality whose attributes of will, perception, memory
and volition interact to determine what testimony he will give.'" Id. at 277 (quoting
Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 879, 881-82 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 954
(1964)).
82 T. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 128 (1935).
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masked how important his work is for more bitingly critical views of
legal doctrine that have captured much contemporary legal scholar-
ship. Arnold's essay is a reminder that there is an important type of
skepticism about legal doctrine that can take doctrine very seriously,
but not necessarily in the terms in which doctrine describes itself.
This type of skepticism adopts a posture of something approaching
a cultural anthropology of the system of doctrine-making. Despite
the tremendous growth in contemporary critical studies of legal
doctrine, studies rooted in both ideological and structuralist prem-
ises, the critical approach to criminal procedure has advanced sur-
prisingly little beyond Arnold's observations.
Of the few efforts in this direction, one of the most important is
Peter Arenella's assessment of over a decade of Burger Court crimi-
nal procedure doctrine in terms of basic questions about the func-
tions of the whole system.8 3 Professor Arenella has attacked the
view of the doctrine that denies the discontinuity between the War-
ren and Burger Courts, and he shifts the perspective on the doctrine
to a more critical angle. He argues that revisionist outcome-count-
ing produces a shallow assessment of the two Courts.8 4 Arenella
also contends that Seidman's subtler comparison, which finds the
rejection by both Courts of a pure guilt/innocence model of proce-
dure to be a significant common denominator, grossly understates
the fundamental differences in political and social philosophy.8 5 Ac-
cording to Arenella, the Burger Court has exhibited a reactionary
inclination to deregulate judicial control of state officials, a hostility
to political norms of fair process, and a willingness to reduce civil
liberties to contrived measurable factors in a conservative utilitarian
calculus.8 6
But in rebutting some of the revisionist responses to what I
have called the conventional view, Arenella does not reaffirm the
conventional view. His is a rare attempt in the literature to treat the
cases seriously as ideological exercises while maintaining a very real-
istic skepticism about the immediate or obvious effects of the doc-
trine which the conventional view assumes. Professor Arenella is
careful not to assume any simple correlation between legal doctrine
and legal or political practice. But as he elaborates on his "recon-
structed" due process and crime control models, he suggests that
we cannot disprove that the ideological content of the case law has
83 Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts'
Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185 (1983).
84 Id. at 186-87.
85 Id. at 195-97.
86 Id. at 247.
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influenced in a host of indirect ways the processes of legislative and
bureaucratic reform and professional training, and the public's per-
ception of the criminal justice system.8 7 I would add that even in a
state of uncertainty about the discernable effects of doctrine, the
striking invasion of the rhetoric of the larger contemporary political
debate into criminal procedure opinions suggests some sort of mu-
tually reinforcing relationship.
88
Arenella cautiously stops short of the more politically charged
critical perspective which asserts that the doctrine is designed to be
an exercise in ideological legitimation, that it is utterly deceptive or
irrelevant in all the functional or political terms in which the con-
ventional analysts address it.89 Ironically, this more purely critical
view holds that the doctrine indeed possesses a great deal of real-
world force, but only in deceptive and perverse terms. Even if we
assume that the doctrine lends fairness and neutrality to the adjudi-
cation of guilt while protecting dignitary values, the system is hypo-
critical and, indeed, it is designed to be hypocritical. It consists
largely of the false promises of a system engaged in symbolic legiti-
mation of an unjust legal and economic system. The promises of
due process doctrine are false because of a number of things: the
cynical market of plea bargaining, the vagueness of the doctrinal
rules or norms which makes them so subject to evasion and manipu-
lation, the vagaries of fact-finding, the unaffordable price of good
representation, and the political and economic prejudice at the
heart of the substantive criminal laws to which the procedural doc-
trines are purely adjectival. 90
This view faces the obstacle of explaining why, if due process
doctrine is designedly hypocritical, the Burger Court has found it
necessary to reverse the Warren Court's ideological efforts.9 1 Nev-
ertheless, this viewpoint does find some striking support in such
matters as the Burger Court's insistence on proper litanies of waiver
87 Id. at 226 n.230.
88 Liberal dissents now regularly include rhetoric from the larger contemporary legal
debate. E.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 681 (MarshallJ., dissenting)("majority
now proposes to return to the scales of social utility to calculate whether Miranda's pro-
phylactic rule remains cost-effective when threats to public's safety are added to the
balance" with "pseudoscientific precision"). Cf. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1301 (1985)(Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) (denouncing the majority's "marble-palace psychoanalysis" and sug-
gesting that it is a psychological myth designed to justify retrenchment on Miranda
principles and to disdain determinist accounts of suspects' behavior).
89 Rudovsky, The Criminal Justice System and the Role of the Police, in THE POLMCS oF
LAw 242 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
90 Id. at 243.
91 Arenella, supra note 81, at 227 n.230.
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in plea bargaining,92 and a terrific example in the one major area
where the Burger Court has purported to retain and indeed
strengthen the suspect's freedom from coercive police investigation:
the sixth amendment right to counsel which grants defendants ex-
panded Miranda-style rights so long as they have passed a wonder-
fully symbolic barrier in the course of the prosecution.93 These
examples suggest that the Court sometimes engages in politically
useful mythology about the free will of people who encounter the
state and about the imagery of informality with which the state can
choose to describe its enounters with people when it finds it useful
to do so. Even though often exaggerated, the extreme critical view
is a useful corrective to the common tendency to take too literally
the seductive and distracting political symbolism of American crimi-
nal procedure doctrine.
IV. CONCLUSION
To some extent, these varieties of skepticism about criminal
procedure doctrine reflect a sense that the discrepancy between the
world of the courts and the world in which the courts are supposed
to operate is even greater in the earthy instance of criminals and
police than it is elsewhere, that the political melodrama is played out
in a happily naive world of Thomistic abstraction. To some extent,
at least from the liberal perspective, it is due to a concern that the
political promises of the Warren Court were quixotic or illusory, or
to a hopeful disbelief that if they did have substance, their effects
could be so quickly and drastically reversed. But underlying these
skeptical impulses may be a half-conscious recognition that the doc-
trine is less important in achieving its supposed goal-the proper
administration of criminal justice-than might once have appeared
to be the case.
92 For example, in Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976), the Court reversed
the murder conviction of a defendant with an I.Q of approximately seventy, finding the
guilty plea invalid because the trial judge had failed to explain to the defendant that
intent was an element of the offense. As Seidman observes, the Court reversed the con-
viction only because the trial court had failed to observe the niceties of the plea bargain-
ing litany, even though the defendant would probably not have understood the litany
anyway, and even though his hypothetical understanding would have done him little
good because the plea bargaining system had permitted a structure of incentives that
made self-condemnation the most rational course anyway. Seidman, supra note 40, at
481-82.
93 See Maine v. Moulton, 106 S. Ct. 477 (1985)(after state brings formal charges
against suspect, sixth amendment right to counsel bars it from circumventing defense
lawyer by usingjailhouse informant to elicit inculpatory statements about other crime);




The conservative version of the conventional view appears
wrong in suggesting that restricting the exclusionary rules of evi-
dence will somehow solve the crime problem in the United States;
rather, the crime problem can probably be solved only by more ex-
pensive state action, assuming that it can be solved by state action at
all. The liberal version may also be wrong in suggesting that judi-
cial review of police action can ever significantly curtail the state's
abuse of people in the criminal justice system, either because most
police abuse will go unregulated by anything short of greater bu-
reaucratic control than our system now contemplates, or because
the real source of the problem lies in broader social and economic
inequities that determine who winds up in the system in the first
place. In any event, we may be seeing signs of a deflationary phase
in the legal politics of criminal justice.
In practical political terms, this "deflation" may prove more
useful to the liberals. The conservatives have largely won their
short-term goal of casting the current doctrinal issues in economic
terms. And once the economic agenda is set, the liberals seemed
destined to lose. In the criminal procedure cases, as in the capital
punishment cases, the conservatives always get the benefit of the
public's wish-fulfilling denial of the empirical weakness of the case
for law-enforcement, or at least the benefit that in cases of insoluble
empirical uncertainty, their assertions carry greater rhetorical at-
traction than the liberals'. Most people in this country find images
ofjudges allowing muggers and killers on the streets far more com-
pelling than images of agents of a police state terrifying us in our
houses. Nevertheless, a new "deflationary" phase may present an
opportunity for both the liberal and conservative sides to make
some realistic adjustments in their approaches to the work of the
Supreme Court, and to look to places other than the Court for ways
of addressing the larger questions about criminal justice.
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